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Abstract
This paper identifies conditions under which an industry-wide practice of
posted (or list) pricing is a plus factor suﬃcient to conclude that firms violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act. For certain classes of markets, it is shown that,
under competition, all firms setting a list price with a policy of no discounting
is contrary to equilibrium. Thus, if all firms choose posted pricing, it is to
facilitate collusion by making it easier for them to coordinate their prices. It
is then argued that the adoption of posted pricing communicates the necessary
intent and reliance to conclude concerted action.
1 Introduction
To discuss collusion from both an economics and legal perspective, it is best to begin
by defining what is meant by "collusion" because economists and lawyers speak of it
in diﬀerent ways. With regards to market conduct, economists have two categories
of behavior: competition and collusion. Competitive (or non-collusive) behavior is
consistent with a static Nash equilibrium for an oligopoly game. In particular, a
firm’s price (or quantity) maximizes current profit given the anticipated prices (or
quantities) of its rivals. Collusive (or coordinated) behavior is an equilibrium for
an infinitely or indefinitely repeated oligopoly game that produces prices in excess of
those associated with a static Nash equilibrium (that is, prices are supracompetitive).
Though a firm prices in excess of (or produces short of) that which maximizes current
profit, it is in the firm’s self-interest to do so because of the anticipated reaction by
other firms in the future if it was to price lower (or produce more). It is then a feature
of collusion that a firm’s behavior hinges on what firms have done in the past.1
∗I am grateful to Jon Baker, George Hay, and Bill Page for their thoughtful and constructive
comments. I remain solely responsible for any mathematical errors and legal misinterpretations.
1For non-technical treatments of how economists think of collusion and how it relates to the law,
see Baker (1993), Yao and DeSanti (1993), and Werden (2004).
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For firms to be at an equilibrium - whether it involves competitive or collusive
prices - they must have achieved mutual understanding regarding the strategies that
they are pursuing. Collusion is distinguished according to how this mutual under-
standing is achieved. With explicit collusion, mutual understanding arises through
express communication among firms. Generally, this takes the form of verbal commu-
nication in which firms reach an agreement as to the strategies they will deploy. Tacit
collusion is when mutual understanding occurs without express communication. It
is worth noting that while economic theory can describe when collusion is feasible
(that is, supracompetitive prices can be sustained by an equilibrium), it has little
to say about the likelihood of collusion (since whenever there is an equilibrium with
collusion, there is also an equilibrium with competition) nor about the relative ease
of tacit and explicit collusion because the current paradigm presumes an equilibrium
and therefore cannot address whether collusion is achieved through explicit or tacit
means.
In defining collusion from the economics perspective, the focus is on the outcome
- are prices supracompetitive or not? - and the mechanism used to sustain that
outcome. In contrast, collusion as defined by the law rests on whether firms have
reached an agreement.
By operationalizing the idea of an agreement, antitrust law clarified
that the idea of an agreement describes a process that firms engage in, not
merely the outcome that they reach. Not every parallel pricing outcome
constitutes an agreement because not every such outcome was reached
through the process to which the law objects: a negotiation that concludes
when the firms convey mutual assurances that the understanding they
reached will be carried out.2
When it comes to the law, there are three types of collusion (as it is defined
by economists), not all of which violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Conscious
parallelism is when supracompetitive prices are achieved without an agreement. An
example often associated with adjacent gasoline or petrol stations is when one station
raises its price to a supracompetitive level and the other station matches the price
hike. While there may be mutual understanding regarding the underlying mechanism
that stabilizes those supracompetitive prices (for example, any price undercutting
results in a return to competitive prices), this understanding was not reached through
any form of direct communication. Express collusion is when supracompetitive prices
are achieved via express communication about an agreement.
Cases that speak of "express" agreements ordinarily involve "direct,"
readily observable proof that the defendants have exchanged assurances
that they will pursue a common course of action: e.g., a document that
describes a collective commitment to pursue a course of conduct, or tes-
timony through which one or more parties to a conspiracy describe how
they formed the conspiracy and recount the conspiracy’s goals.3
2Baker (1993), p. 179.
3Kovacic (1993), p. 19.
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Conscious parallelism is legal because there is not thought to be an agreement, while
express collusion is illegal.4
Residing between these two extremes is concerted action. Concerted action is
when supracompetitive prices are achieved with communication - such as about in-
tentions - but firms do not expressly propose and reach an agreement.
The parties ... engage in a concerted practice by communicating and
then act consistently with the communications. While American courts
typically use "concerted action" interchangeably with "agreement," In-
terstate Circuit appears to recognize concerted action as a species of
agreement that requires the concurrence of both a plan and an action
in accordance with the plan.5
In Interstate Circuit (1939), the Court stated:
It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was contemplated
or invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and partici-
pated in it. ... [A]cceptance by competitors, without previous agreement,
of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of
which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is suﬃcient to
establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.6
In their attempt to avoid prosecution under the Sherman Act, steel manufac-
turers assiduously avoided talk of any agreement about prices during their regular
meetings (Page, 2009a). Instead, they made statements as to whether prices were
"fair and reasonable" and suggesting prices to be charged. In spite of the lack of ex-
press communication as to an agreement, participants admitted to achieving mutual
understanding and they were convicted.
In comparing the economic and legal definitions, conscious parallelism and con-
certed action are types of tacit collusion which diﬀer in how mutual understanding
is reached. Thus, tacit collusion, as defined by economists, is not necessarily illegal.
In this paper, the concern is with tacit collusion and when we can conclude it was
achieved through concerted action, rather than conscious parallelism, and thus is
prosecutable under the Sherman Act.
Given the legal standard, the challenge faced in prosecuting tacit collusion is
providing "direct or circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that
[the parties] had a conscious commitment to a common scheme designed to achieve
an unlawful objective."7 What has to be established is that firms have a "unity of
purpose or a common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds"8 which
"tends to exclude the possibility of independent action".9 The problem is then "how
4As we will discuss in Section 5, Richard Posner has famously argued that one might be able to
conclude there is an agreement under what is considered conscious parallelism.
5Page (2007), p. 439.
6 Interstate Circuit, Inc., et al.v. United States Paramount Pictures Distributing Co., Inc., et al.
v. Same, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
7Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
8American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
9Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
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far may we move away from direct, detailed, and reciprocal exchanges of assurances
on a common course of action and yet remain within the statutory and conceptual
boundaries of an agreement."10
This task has proven to be diﬃcult though not entirely insurmountable. While
this paper is not the place to describe the various successful arguments for proving
Section 1 violations when evidence of express communication regarding an agreement
is lacking,11 there is one line of attack that is especially relevant to what will occur
in this paper. This approach involves foregoing trying to establish that there was a
"meeting of the minds" through tacit means, and focusing instead on those practices
which are suspected of facilitating mutual understanding with regards to coordinated
pricing.
I am convinced that the diﬀerence between unlawful "tacit collusion"
and lawful oligopolistic interdependence is not to be found in any phrase
that describes the state of mind of the industry participants. Once we
are outside the boundary of a formal agreement, whatever degree of "as-
surance", "meeting of the minds", "conscious commitment to a common
scheme", etc., that exists in a situation of tacit collusion can exist to the
same extent in a situation of (lawful) classic oligopoly. Rather, if there is
to be a category of unlawful tacit collusion which is to be distinguished
from classic oligopoly, the diﬀerence must lie, not in the state of mind
of the competitors, but on the specific elements of behavior that brought
about that state of mind.12
Pursuant to this approach, a practice that has arisen in several cases is the public
announcement by firms of a policy to set a list price with no discounting oﬀ of
that list price, which we will refer to as posted pricing. This practice was a central
feature in a case brought against General Electric and Westinghouse in the market for
turbine generators, which are high expenditure custom-ordered equipment commonly
purchased by power generating companies.
In May 1963 ... General Electric announced a new pricing policy
for turbine generators. One facet of the policy was the publication of a
new and more simplified pricing book that permitted rival Westinghouse
rather easily to compute the "book" price of any generator on which the
two firms might be asked to bid. GE also announced a standard multi-
plier it would apply to the book price on each bid, and it communicated
its intent not to deviate from the standard "book price times announced
multiplier" procedure in bidding. The multiplier itself varied over time,
but changes were publicly announced by General Electric. Consequently,
what might otherwise have been a very complex coordination problem
was reduced to a matter of Westinghouse’s knowing how to calculate the
10Phillip E. Areeda, Antitrust Law 9-12 (1986); cited in Kovacic (1993), p. 18-9.
11On that topic, the reader is referred to Kovacic (1993).
12Hay (2000), pp. 127-128.
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so-called book price and following GE’s price leadership with respect to
the multiplier. ... [T]he two companies are said to have applied identical
multipliers to identical book prices on their turbogenerator bids for the
next 12 years - until the practices were challenged by federal antitrust
authorities. In sharp contrast to the history of the 1950s and early 1960s
[when they explicitly colluded], GE and Westinghouse eﬀected no gener-
ator price decreases during this period. General Electric led a number
of price increases, with Westinghouse typically following by announcing
an identical multiplier increase within four days (although on one occa-
sion the lag was three months). Thus, by linking price leadership to a
simplification of the methods for computing bid prices, General Electric
successfully avoided the pricing coordination breakdown that had mate-
rialized even with outright collusion in earlier periods.13
In response to this and other practices, the U.S. Department of Justice planned to
file a civil antitrust suit but then the parties settled with a modification of the 1962
consent decree from the previous Section 1 case against these firms. The DOJ’s view
was:
[Though] there was no evidence of any formal communication or agree-
ment between GE and Westinghouse, ... the independent yet parallel
adoption of the new policy by GE and Westinghouse had brought about
a meeting of the minds and facilitated the elimination of price competi-
tion.14
Another case in which this practice arose was the private suit Wall Products Co.
v. National Gypsum Co. The major producers of gypsum wallboard had a policy of
not oﬀering discounts oﬀ of their list price, though there with some exceptions. Due to
declining demand and excess industry capacity, this policy unravelled in 1964-65 with
ever-increasing discounts and a drastic decline in profits. In response, United States
Gypsum Company (USG) mailed an announcement to its customers on November
17, 1965 which stated:
Any discounts of gypsum board and/or plaster products previously
extended to meet competition will be withdrawn as of December 15, 1965.
As a constructive move, we have decided to sell our gypsum products
solely on the basis of our published prices.15
In its decision, the U.S. District Court stated:
The USG witnesses unanimously testified that the success of the new
pricing policy was dependent on the other major competitors following
13Scherer (1980), p. 182.
14Hay (2000), p. 115.
15Wall Products Co. v. National Gypsum Co. (1971), 326 F. Supp. 295.
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suit. As Mr. Watt [Vice-President of Marketing at USG] said, the great
danger of this announcement was "the possibility that the other producers
would go right on making or meeting lower prices."16
Shortly after this announcement, all major suppliers followed USG’s lead by
adopting the same no-discounting policy with the same eﬀective date. Georgia-Pacific
and National made their announcement one week later, with five other suppliers fol-
lowing suit within two weeks. The U.S. District Court concluded:
That during the period from December 15, 1965 until January 1, 1968,
USG, National and Kaiser combined and conspired among themselves and
with others, to stabilize and maintain the price level of gypsum wallboard
through a course of interdependent conscious parallel action pursuant to
a tacit understanding by acquiescence coupled with assistance whereby
they mutually agreed to, and did in fact, eﬀective December 15, 1965,
withdraw all deviations from list or published prices of gypsum wallboard
...17
In both the turbine generator and gypsum wallboard cases, the practice of direct
concern was the contemporaneous public adoption of a policy to set list prices and
not oﬀer discounts. There was no evidence of an express agreement to adopt this
new pricing policy, nor regarding the list prices to be set. The open question I seek
to address here is whether circumstances can be identified under which the parallel
adoption of posted pricing is suﬃcient to establish a violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act. A critical step in doing so will be to rule out reasons for adopting
posted pricing unrelated to collusion. For if there is a legitimate rationale then it
will not be possible to "exclude the possibility of independent action". Towards that
end, the various eﬀects of posted pricing are described in Section 2, which are: i)
reducing consumer search costs; ii) reducing firms’ selling costs; iii) reducing the
responsiveness of price to cost and demand conditions; and iv) aﬀecting the manner
in which firms compete. As (i) and (ii) can provide a legitimate rationale for the
adoption of posted pricing, market situations are identified for which these eﬀects
are minimal. To explore (iii) and (iv), a model is developed in Section 3 which is
then analyzed in Section 4 to determine when competitive firms will adopt posted
pricing. (For those who’d rather avoid the mathematical modelling and analysis in
Sections 3 and 4, a summary of the results are at the start of Section 4.) Using that
economic analysis, Section 5 applies some recent legal arguments by William Page
(2007, 2010) to make the case for concerted action when there is parallel adoption of
posted pricing. Section 6 concludes with a few remarks about drawing the judicial
line regarding when communication conveys a collusive agreement.
16 Ibid
17 Ibid
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2 Catalog of Eﬀects of Posted Pricing
Posted pricing has a long history. Quakers were an early proponent (Kent, 1983) on
the grounds that customers should be charged a "fair price" and since what is fair
does not vary with the customer then all customers should receive the same price.
With the advent of department stores and sales being conducted by paid employees
(compare this to the owner-run general store), it became desirable to centralize pricing
authority. By the mid-19th century, Bon Marche in Paris (Miller, 1993) and Macy’s in
New York (Hower, 1943) were charging a fixed price for goods. Clearly, posted pricing
has a history quite independent of any role it might play in facilitating collusion. It
is then critical to distinguish the many instances in which posted pricing is legitimate
from when it is not.
In considering the various eﬀects of posted pricing, the alternative is to have,
to some degree, transaction-specific pricing, whereby price may vary with customer
traits, the particulars of the product demanded, and the time at which the customer
requests a price quote.18 Transaction-specific pricing can involve a range of institu-
tions ranging from the seller making a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the buyer (as they
do with posted pricing but where now the price is tailored to the transaction) to
back-and-forth negotiation between the buyer and seller. In our formal analysis, the
former is assumed and there will be some discussion of the robustness of results to
the latter. The general discussion in this section applies quite broadly to transaction-
specific pricing.
There are four possible eﬀects of moving from transaction-specific pricing to
posted pricing: i) reducing consumer search costs; ii) reducing firms’ selling costs; iii)
reducing the responsiveness of price to cost and demand conditions; and iv) aﬀecting
the manner in which firms compete. The first two eﬀects relate to buyers and sellers
incurring lower costs to transact.
By having a set price, it is potentially easier for a consumer to collect price in-
formation compared to some other institutions such as bargaining. These lower con-
sumer search costs from posted pricing can benefit consumers in three ways. First,
even if the prices charged are the same and a consumer considers the same set of
sellers (that is, conduct the same set of searches), lower search costs mean a con-
sumer has engaged in less time and eﬀort in collecting this information, and thereby
benefits. Consider, for example, the retail automobile market where buyers and sell-
ers negotiate over price. A buyer engages in a time-consuming and, depending on
the person, mentally-draining negotiation in order to learn a car’s price. An auto
retailer posting a non-negotiable price avoids those consumer costs.19 There is then a
18To some degree, these features can be built into a posted pricing scheme by specifying a formula
mapping product features into price or having seasonal pricing. But even if this is done, price will
be less sensitive to these factors under posted pricing.
19 It has been argued in previous research that firms may oﬀer a mixture of formats - some posting
price, some negotiating over price - because of buyer heterogeneity in the skill or cost of bargaining
among buyers. Unskilled bargainers will buy from posted price firms - at relatively high prices -
and skilled bargainers will buy from those which negotiate. See, for example, Arnold and Lippman
(1998) and Desai and Purohit (2004).
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pro-competitive benefit from posting prices in that it reduces consumer search costs.
Second, a reduction in search costs will generally mean its optimal for consumers to
engage in more search. Thus, even each firm’s price is unchanged with posted pric-
ing (compared to the preceding pricing institution), conducting more search means a
consumer will find a better deal because the minimum observed price will, on average.
Third, competing firms may be inclined to price lower in response to the anticipation
that consumers will search more, in which case consumers again benefit.20
If firms are not colluding, they too can benefit from the reduction in consumer
search costs brought about by posted pricing. By making it easier for consumers to
search, more consumers are attracted to the market because they anticipate finding
a better deal. Firms can then benefit from larger demand. This eﬀect potentially
provides a rationale for firms to adopt posted pricing which is predicated on reducing
market frictions, rather than facilitating collusion.
Posted pricing can also act to reduce firm selling costs. Consider again the case
of auto retailing. If price is to be determined through buyer-seller bargaining then a
sales representative needs to be skilled in the art of negotiation. But when there is
posted pricing - as occurs through the use of such web sites as Autobytel.com - an
auto dealer’s sales representative does not negotiate price, though must still sell the
merits of the car and the dealership. For the firm, posted pricing reduces training
expenditure, lowers the wages they have to pay to attract skilled sales representatives,
and results in more transactions per employee as each transaction takes less time since
there is no negotiation over price. Firms directly benefit from these lower selling costs.
Consumers may also benefit if these lower selling costs translate into lower prices.
As with lower consumer search costs, lower selling costs provide a pro-competitive
benefit and a rationale for firms to adopt posted pricing apart from aiding collusion.
As the preceding discussion suggests, there are clearly some markets - perhaps
most markets - for which the savings in consumer search and firm selling costs from
posting prices are likely to be significant, and thereby deliver pro-competitive bene-
fits and provide a legitimate basis for this practice. Most retail markets in developed
countries have naturally evolved to having posted pricing, presumably for these rea-
sons. The point seems obvious and not worth belaboring.
What I want to claim is that there are also markets for which the reduction in
consumer search and firm selling costs from posted pricing - as opposed to transaction-
specific pricing - are likely to be trivial, and thus do not provide a pro-competitive
benefit nor a competitive rationale for firms setting list prices with a no discounting
policy. One such example is the market for turbine generators, which was previously
discussed. It is reasonable to presume that a purchasing agent for an electric power
company would receive a price quote from both GE and Westinghouse, whether
those suppliers post prices or a purchasing agent must go through a series of price
negotiations with employees of GE and Westinghouse. The expenditure associated
with the product is suﬃciently large to warrant investing the time to get a price
20See, for example, Anderson and Renault (1999) who find that prices fall when search costs are
lower. In that paper - and related ones which endogenize price in a market with search costs - the
pricing institution is kept fixed (which happens to be posted pricing) and an exogenous search cost
is changed.
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quote. In that case, consumers will have the same information irrespective of the
pricing format used by sellers. Furthermore, any savings in search costs are small
relative to the expenditure involved and thus are not a first-order eﬀect. From the
suppliers’ perspective, there is still a need for a well-trained sales force even with
posted pricing. Though there is no price negotiation, there are many non-price traits
to sell a customer on, including product features, quality, warranty, delivery time,
and after-sales support. Again, the savings in time and training from posting prices
are likely to be minimal. It would then seem that this market is one for which posted
pricing would generate little in terms of savings in consumer search and firm selling
costs.
Moving beyond examples, it is useful to identify those factors which determine the
extent of savings in consumer search and firm selling costs from the adoption of posted
pricing. First, the fewer suppliers there are, the more likely that a consumer will learn
all suppliers’ prices whether or not firms engage in posted pricing, in which case pro-
competitive benefits from posted pricing are less. Second, the larger expenditure
associated with the product (whether due to a high price per unit or high volume),
the more attractive is it to engage in intense search regardless of the firms’ pricing
format in that the expected benefit from a lower price is likely to be large relative to
the search costs. Third, the more diﬀerentiated and less-standardized the product,
the more valuable it is for firms to have a well-trained skilled sales force, even if they
post prices. Fourth, the more frequent the purchase, the more that consumers and
firms will, through experience, reduce negotiation costs so that less is saved with
posted pricing. For example, a purchasing agent who buys an input every quarter
will have smaller consumer search cost savings from posted pricing than a consumer
who buys an electronic product every few years. In sum, savings in consumer search
and firm selling costs are likely to be lowest when consumers are industrial buyers
making large frequent purchases of a non-standardized product from a limited set
of suppliers. In contrast, markets involving standardized low expenditure products
with many suppliers are likely to have significant pro-competitive benefits from posted
pricing because of the reduction in consumer search and firm selling costs. While the
redeeming feature of lower consumer search and firm selling costs from posting price is
then apt to be quite ubiquitous in retail markets, they may be of much less relevance
when customers are industrial buyers.
Let us hereon consider markets for which the savings in consumer search and
firm selling costs are minimal, which leaves two eﬀects to be evaluated. First, posted
pricing reduces the responsiveness of price to cost and demand conditions. By setting
a list price for some period of time and not oﬀering discounts, price is less sensitive to
changes in input prices, customer characteristics, capacity constraints, and the like.
Second, posted pricing aﬀects the manner in which firms compete. A firm is likely to
end up charging a diﬀerent price if its rivals are posting price compared to when they
are setting transaction-specific prices. The direction of that eﬀect is not obvious and
thus requires formal analysis.
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3 General Model
Consider a duopoly setting in which, in each period, there is one unit of demand.
Firm i’s cost to supplying this unit - denoted ci - is drawn from [c, c] according to cdf
F . F is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with positive density on (c, c) and mean μ.
Assume firms’ costs are independent across firms and time. Cost could vary over time
because of changes in input prices or customer heterogeneity along with the identity
of the consumer changing from period to period.
Prior to choosing its price, a firm makes a longer-run decision regarding its pricing
format. It can have one of two formats which we refer to as posted price and quoted
price. As with GE’s price book, the idea of a posted price is that it is fixed over
some extended length of time. In the context of our model, this means that price is
chosen prior to learning the cost for the current period’s demand. For example, the
price book or multiplier may be adjusted annually, while there is a customer arriving
each week. In contrast, a quoted price format means that price is consumer-specific,
and thus is set after a firm learns its cost for the current period’s customer. What is
critical is that a firm’s price under the quoted price format is more sensitive to the
cost of serving a particular customer at a particular point in time than the posted
price format.
The extensive form is as follows:
Price Format Subgame: Firms simultaneously choose between the posted price
and quoted price formats.
Price Subgame: .
Stage 1: If a firm chose the posted price format then it chooses its price.
Stage 2: Firms realize their costs. Costs are private information.
Stage 3: If a firm chose the quoted price format then it chooses its price know-
ing its cost and, when the other firm chose the posted price format, the
other firm’s price as well. If both firms chose the quoted price format then
they simultaneously choose price, each knowing only its own cost.
If both firms chose the posted price format then they make simultaneous price
decisions based on their prior beliefs on costs. If they both chose the quoted price
format then they make simultaneous price decisions given each firm knows only its
own cost, which is exactly the informational setting in Spulber (1995). Finally, if, say,
firm 1 posts price and firm 2 quotes price then firm 1 chooses price as a first-mover
(given its prior beliefs on firms’ costs) and firm 2 chooses its price after learning its
cost and firm 1’s price. Consistent with the case of low consumer search costs, it
is assumed that consumers observe both firms’ prices, regardless of the price format
used.
The solution concept is perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. For each of the four price
subgames - both have the posted price format, both have the quoted price format,
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and they have mixed formats - we solve for a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The price
format game is then the simple 2× 2 game:
Price Format Subgame
Firm 2
Firm 1
Posted Price Quoted Price
Posted Price πPP , πPP πPQ, πQP
Quoted Price πQP , πPQ πQQ, πQQ
where πRS is the equilibrium expected profit earned by a firm that chose format
R ∈ {P,Q} and its rival chose format S ∈ {P,Q}, where P denotes posted price and
Q denotes quoted price. Let pRS be the associated equilibrium price. If there is an
equilibrium for each of the price subgames - so that the payoﬀs in the Price Format
Subgame are defined - then there will be a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium as follows:
• If πPP ≥ πQP then both having posted prices is an equilibrium outcome.
• If πQQ ≥ πPQ then both having quoted prices is an equilibrium outcome.
• If πPP ≤ πQP and πQQ ≤ πPQ then one firm having posted prices and the
other firm having quoted prices is an equilibrium outcome.
The one remaining element to model is the determination of which firm ends
up selling to the current period’s customer. In Section 4.1, it is assumed the firms’
products are identical in which case the firm with the lower price sells with probability
one. In Section 4.2, we allow for diﬀerentiated products by assuming the probability
of selling depends continuously on the price diﬀerence and is decreasing in the amount
by which a firm’s price exceeds its rival’s price.
Before moving on to the analysis, it is worth discussing this set-up when firms’
costs are deterministic and common knowledge. Under that assumption, the game is
the standard two-period endogenous move game which has been analyzed many times
before (see, for example, Amir and Stepanova, 2006, and references cited therein).
Each firm decides whether to set its price in period 1 (corresponding to posting price
in our model) - in which case it is a price leader if the other firm chose to price in
period 2 - or in period 2 (corresponding to quoting price in our model) - in which case
it is a price follower if the other firm chose to price in period 1. If both firms chose
to price in the same period then it is a simultaneous-move price game. With firms
choosing prices, their decision variables are strategic complements and thus there
is an advantage to being a second mover. Equilibrium is characterized by one firm
pricing in period 1 and the other firm pricing in period 2. Intuitively, the first-mover
prices above the Nash equilibrium price for the simultaneous-move game so as to
induce the second-mover to price higher, given that the latter’s best reply function
is increasing in its rival’s price. This benefits both firms relative to when there is no
price leader.
Thus, without cost variability, it is not an equilibrium for firms to set prices simul-
taneously and thus not an equilibrium for both to post prices. With cost variability
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- as is presence in our model - there is an additional benefit to quoting price (that
is, moving second) in that a firm’s price can be responsive to its cost. This certainly
suggests that we should not find it to be an equilibrium for both firms to post prices
and that it may even be the case that equilibrium involves both firms quoting price,
with no firm taking the role of price leader. Why this result is not immediate - and,
in fact, it’ll take some structure to deliver it - is that, from the perspective of a posted
price firm, its rival’s price is now stochastic (being driven by its stochastic cost) when
its rival moves second by quoting price. This significantly complicates the analysis
in comparing pricing incentives when posting and quoting price, given the other firm
quotes price. However, by putting plausible structure on demand, we can show that
this complication does not disturb the pricing incentives in the deterministic cost
case and thus it will be inconsistent with equilibrium for both firms to post prices.
4 Economic Analysis
The economic analysis considers the endogenous choice of the pricing format, with
each firm deciding between having a fixed price (posted price) and a transaction-
specific price (quoted price), while assuming consumer search and firm selling costs
are small. When firms have homogeneous products, I show that it is strictly more
profitable for a firm to use the quoted price format than the posted price format,
regardless of its rival’s format. This implies that any firm posting price is inconsistent
with competition. When firms have diﬀerentiated products, it is shown that the
industry-wide adoption of posted pricing is inconsistent with competition. In sum,
the parallel adoption of posted pricing is not in a firm’s best interests, unless it leads
to firms coordinating their prices.
4.1 Homogeneous Products
The existence and characterization of perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria for when prod-
ucts are homogeneous can easily be shown by pulling together existing results in the
literature. Specifically, we draw heavily upon Spulber (1995) and Arozamena and
Weinschelbaum (2009); both of whom draw upon Maskin and Riley (1984) for exis-
tence of equilibrium when both firms have the quoted price format. In Section 4.1.1
we solve for equilibrium in prices for each of the three possible price format subgames:
both firms post price, both firms quote prices, and firms have diﬀerent formats. With
those equilibrium payoﬀs, the price format subgame is then solved in Section 4.1.2.
4.1.1 Price Subgames
• Both firms have the posted price format
Consider the case when both firms post prices. As there is no private information
- each firm chooses its price prior to learning its cost - this is the classical Bertrand
price game except that expected cost, μ, replaces deterministic cost. Thus, firm 1’s
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expected profit is:
πPP1 (p1, p2) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
p1 − μ if p1 < p2¡
1
2
¢
(p1 − μ) if p1 = p2
0 if p1 > p2
The unique Nash equilibrium has each set price equal to expected cost - pPP = μ -
and earn zero expected profit.
• Both firms have the quoted price format
Suppose both firms quote prices. The price subgame is exactly as analyzed in
Spulber (1995) except that we assume unit demand, while there it is assumed market
demand is strictly decreasing in price. In Proposition 2, Spulber (1995) establishes
the existence of a unique symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium, and that a firm’s equi-
librium price is strictly increasing in its cost. As straightforward inspection reveals
that the proof of Proposition 2 also works with unit demand, this result applies here
as well.
Letting φ : [c, c] → <+ denote the symmetric equilibrium price function, it is
defined by
φ (c) = argmax (p− c)
£
1− F
¡
φ−1 (p)
¢¤
, ∀c ∈ [c, c] . (1)
Given, say, firm 2 uses φ, if firm 1 charges a price of p1, it has the lowest price - and
sells to the customer - if and only if φ (c2) > p1. Since φ is strictly increasing, this
condition is equivalent to c2 > φ−1 (p1) and, therefore, the probability that firm 1
sells is 1− F
¡
φ−1 (p1)
¢
, as stated in (1). The first-order condition (FOC) is:
1− F
¡
φ−1 (p)
¢
− (p− c)F 0
¡
φ−1 (p)
¢µ∂φ−1 (p)
∂p
¶
= 0
1− F
¡
φ−1 (φ (c))
¢
− (φ (c)− c)F 0
¡
φ−1 (φ (c))
¢µ∂φ−1 (φ (c))
∂p
¶
= 0
1− F (c)− (φ (c)− c)F 0 (c)
µ
1
φ0 (c)
¶
= 0
φ is then the unique solution to the diﬀerential equation,
φ (c)− c = φ0 (c)
µ
1− F (c)
F 0 (c)
¶
(2)
with boundary condition φ (c) = c. Since φ0 > 0 then (2) implies φ (c) > c ∀c < c.
Firms then have positive expected profit when they have the quoted price format:Z
(φ (c)− c) [1− F (c)]F 0 (c) dc > 0.
• Mix of posted price and quoted price formats
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Suppose firm 1 chose the posted price format and firm 2 chose the quoted price
format. Firm 1’s strategy is then simply a price - as it chooses its price before learning
its cost - while firm 2’s strategy maps the space of cost levels for firm 2 and price
levels for firm 1 into its own price space.
Let us first solve for firm 2’s equilibrium strategy. If p1 > c2 then firm 2 sets a
price just below p1 and sells with probability one. If we assume that ties go to the
firm with the quoted price format then firm 2’s equilibrium price is p1 when p1 > c2.
If p1 ≤ c2, then firm 2 prices at or above its cost and firm 1 sells with probability
one. Thus, firm 2’s equilibrium strategy can be stated as:
ψPQ2 (p1, c2) =
½
p1 if p1 > c2
c2 if p1 ≤ c2
As firm 1 sells if and only if its price is less than firm 2’s cost, its optimization problem
is
max
p1
Z
(p1 − c1) [1− F (p1)]F 0 (c1) dc1 = max
p1
(p1 − μ) [1− F (p1)] ,
which has a unique solution if F 00 ≥ 0 or F 00 is not too negative.
4.1.2 Price Format Subgame
In characterizing what happens when firms are choosing a price format, let us begin
by comparing a firm’s profit between the two price formats, given its rival chooses
the quoted price format. The ensuing analysis uses results from Arozamena and
Weinschelbaum (2009).
For when firm 1 posts price, it was shown above that firm 1 sells if and only if
its price is less than firm 2’s cost; in other words, it is "as if" firm 2 is pricing at its
cost. Firm 1’s expected profit is then
(p1 − μ) [1− F (p1)] . (3)
For the same price for firm 1, now consider expected profit if it quotes price (once
again assuming firm 2 quotes price):Z
(p1 − c1)
£
1− F
¡
φ−1 (p1)
¢¤
F 0 (c1) dc1 = (p1 − μ)
£
1− F
¡
φ−1 (p1)
¢¤
. (4)
Since φ−1 (p) < p - that is, the cost for which firm 2 prices at p (with the quoted
price format) is less than p - then
1− F
¡
φ−1 (p1)
¢
> 1− F (p1) .
Hence, for any p1, (4) exceeds (3) and therefore, expected profit is higher when
firm 1 chooses the quoted price format, given firm 2 chose the quoted price format.
This result comes from firm 2 pricing less aggressively when firm 1 also quotes price
compared to when it posts price. Thus, if firm 1 were to choose the same price under
the quoted price format as it would have chosen under the posted price format, its
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expected profit will be higher because firm 2 doesn’t price as low. In addition, with
the quoted price format, firm 1 is able to adjust its price to its cost, in which case
expected profit is then even higher. In sum, πQQ > πPQ.
When products are homogeneous, the price format subgame is then:
Price Format Subgame
Firm 2
Firm 1
Posted Price Quoted Price
Posted Price 0, 0 πPQ, πQP
Quoted Price πQP , πPQ πQQ, πQQ
where πQQ > πPQ and πQP > 0. Thus, quoting price strictly dominates posting
price and, therefore, perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium implies that both firms have the
quoted price format. Intuitively, a firm gains a tremendous advantage by quoting
price when its rival posts price as it can simply undercut the posted price and make
a sale for sure. Thus, a firm surely want to quotes price when its rival posts price. It
also means that if the other firm quotes price, a firm is at a great disadvantage if it
posts price.
Theorem 1 If products are homogeneous then both firms choose the quoted price
format at a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
4.2 Diﬀerentiated Products
In this section, I consider when firms’ products are diﬀerentiated so that a firm has
a positive probability of making a sale even when its price is higher than its rival.
Let us continue to assume there is one customer per period who buys from either
firm 1 or firm 2. The stochastic process describing the consumer’s purchase decision
is assumed to depend only on the price diﬀerence. Let β (∆) : <→ [0, 1] denote the
probability that a firm sells when the diﬀerence between its rival’s price and its own
price is ∆. For example, suppose the quality diﬀerential between firm 2 and firm 1 is
the random variable ν with cdf H, and a consumer buys from firm 1 iﬀ ν < p2 − p1;
then β (∆) = H (∆) . The following assumptions are made.
A1 β (∆) + β (−∆) = 1, ∀∆ ∈ <.
A2 β (·) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable.
A3 β0 (∆) > 0, ∀∆ ∈ <.
A4 β00 (∆) ≥ 0 if ∆ ≤ 0, β00 (0) = 0, and β00 (∆) ≤ 0 if ∆ ≥ 0.
A1 states that a consumer buys from either firm 1 or firm 2, and implies β (0) =
1/2. A3 has the natural property that a lower price by a firm raises its probability of
making the sale. By A4, β is weakly convex then weakly concave with the inflection
point at ∆ = 0. It follows from A3 and A4 that the probability of purchase is most
sensitive to the price diﬀerence when firms have identical prices: β0 (0) ≥ β0 (∆) , ∀∆.
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An example satisfying A1-A4 is the logistic, β (∆) = 1/
¡
1 + e−∆
¢
, which is shown in
Figure 1. Also, it’ll simplify proofs if it is assumed the density function on a firm’s
cost, F 0, is symmetric around its mean μ.
Figure 1: Probability of firm 1 making the sale
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Suppose both firms have the posted price format. A symmetric equilibrium price
is defined by:
pPP ∈ argmax (p− μ)β
¡
pPP − p
¢
.
Assume the FOC is suﬃcient for an optimum:
β (0)−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0 (0) = 0⇒ pPP = μ+ β (0)
β0 (0)
= μ+
1
2β0 (0)
.
The second-order condition (SOC) for firm 1 is:
−2β0 (p2 − p1) + (p2 − μ)β00 (p2 − p1) < 0.
Note that it holds in equilibrium as firms charge identical prices and β00 (0) = 0.
Furthermore, it holds if β is close to linear over the relevant domain (that is, price
diﬀerences pertinent to determining whether a price pair is an equilibrium).
Next consider when firm 1 posts price and firm 2 quotes price. Define ψPQ2 (p1,c2)
as firm 2’s best reply function given firm 1’s price and firm 2’s cost.
ψPQ2 (p1,c2) ∈ argmax (p− c2) [1− β (p− p1)] .
The FOC is:
1− β
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´
−
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− c2
´
β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´
= 0. (5)
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The SOC is
−2β0 (p2 − p1)− (p2 − c2)β00 (p2 − p1) < 0,
and again is satisfied when β is close to linear. Take the total derivative of (5) with
respect to p1 to derive ∂ψ
PQ
2 (p1, c2) /∂p1:
∂ψPQ2 (p1, c2)
∂p1
=
β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´
+
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− c2
´
β00
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´
2β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´
+
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− c2
´
β00
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´ .
To ensure
∂ψPQ2 (p1, c2)
∂p1
> 0,
it is assumed
β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´
+
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− c2
´
β00
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´
> 0. (6)
Note that it implies
∂ψPQ2 (p1, c2)
∂p1
∈ (0, 1) .
(6) can also be shown to imply that firm 2’s optimal price is increasing in its cost:
∂ψPQ2 (p1, c2)
∂c2
> 0.
A suﬃcient condition for (6) to hold is that β (·) is not too far from being linear over
the relevant price range.
Given firm 2’s best reply function, consider firm 1’s problem in the PQ-subgame:
pPQ1 ∈ argmax
Z c
c
(p1 − μ)β
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´
F 0 (c2) dc2.
We want to show that, in equilibrium, firm 1’s posted price is higher when firm 2
quotes price compared to when firm 2 posts price: pPQ1 > p
PP . If that is the case then
firm 2’s expected profit is higher with the quoted price format - that is, πPQ2 > π
PP
- since its expected profit is increasing in its rival’s posted price. Furthermore, firm
2 benefits from the quoted price format by being able to adjust its price to its cost.
From this result we’ll conclude that both firms choosing a posted price format is not
part of a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The proof of the following lemma is in the
appendix.
Lemma 2 If (6) holds then pPQ1 > p
PP .
Finally, we can use Lemma 2 to show that, given firm 1 has the posted price
format, firm 2’s expected profit is higher when it chooses the quoted price format.
Note that firm 2’s expected profit from the posted price format and price p2 is
(p2 − μ)
£
1− β
¡
p2 − pPP
¢¤
.
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From choosing the quoted price format and price p2, it is
(p2 − μ)
h
1− β
³
p2 − pPQ1
´i
.
The latter exceeds the former because pPQ1 > p
PP . Under the quoted price format,
firm 2’s expected profit is actually even higher as it can condition its price on its cost,
in which case expected profit isZ
max
p2
(p2 − c2)
h
1− β
³
p2 − pPQ1
´i
F 0 (c2) dc2.
Theorem 3 Both firms having the posted price format is inconsistent with perfect
Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
4.3 Case of Buyer-Seller Negotiation
The main finding of the economic analysis is that all firms choosing the posted price
format is inconsistent with competition when the savings in consumer search costs and
firm selling costs are small. In deriving this result, it was assumed that the alternative
to posting price is making a customer-specific fixed price oﬀer. A diﬀerent alternative
is for the seller and buyer to negotiate. This raises the question of whether posted
pricing is inconsistent with equilibrium if firms had to choose between negotiation
and the posted price format. As we argue below, our results are robust to that
alteration when products are homogeneous, but the question remains open for the
case of diﬀerentiated products.
Consider when firms oﬀer identical products. As shown in Section 4.1, if both
firms have the posted price format then each will earn zero expected profit. Now
suppose a seller negotiated with buyers. As long as negotiation does not always give
all of the surplus to the buyer - for example, the firm with the lower cost in the
current period is bargained down to a price below the higher cost firm but not all
the way down to its own cost - then expected profit is positive to a firm who chooses
a negotiation format, regardless of the pricing format chose by its rival. Thus, it is
not an equilibrium for both firms to choose the posted price format even when the
alternative is negotiating with buyers.
With the case of diﬀerentiated products, there is no such immediate proof because
firms earn positive profit under the posted price format. The determination of the
robustness of Theorem 3 to introducing buyer-seller negotiation is left to future re-
search. There is also some reason to think that the result may not be robust; that is,
a firm may prefer the posted price format to buyer-seller negotiation. For the case of
a monopoly, it has been shown that oﬀering a fixed price to all buyers yields higher
expected profit than negotiating with buyers and engaging in price discrimination
(Riley and Zeckhauser, 1983). Of course, just because it is optimal for a monopolist
to post price, it does not follow that it is optimal for a duopolist to do so. Indeed,
that is not the case when firms have homogeneous products, as argued above.
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5 Legal Analysis
There are three steps to the analysis in this section. First, I review the legal argument
that an agreement can be inferred without express communication if it can be shown
that firms communicate their intent to raise prices and their reliance on each other to
do the same. This communication is a plus factor that establishes concerted action.
Second, it is argued that such communication of intent and reliance is achieved when
each firm takes an action that is only in its best interests if it would subsequently
lead to coordinated pricing. Third, using the economic analysis of Section 4, this
legal argument is used to conclude that, under certain circumstances, the parallel
adoption of posted pricing meets the standard laid out in the second step and thereby
is a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The starting point to our analysis is the lack of evidence that firms have engaged
in express communication regarding an agreement. The challenge is then finding plus
factors that allow one to dismiss observed behavior as conscious parallelism.
The lower courts and, now, Twombly have made clear that when firms
coordinate their actions by conscious parallelism they act independently
as a matter of law. The plaintiﬀ must thus produce a "plus factor," that
is, some evidence that is not only consistent with agreement, but also
inconsistent with independent or merely interdependent conduct.21
Useful for identifying plus factors is considering what is suﬃcient to conclude that
firms have engaged in concerted action. Under the principle of concerted action, firms,
while not expressly engaging in an agreement, do, in some manner, communicate a
plan and then follow through with it. Applying the work of Black (2005), William
Page argues:
[F]irms’ actions become concerted when the firms have achieved the
conditions of conscious parallelism by communication of their intent to
raise prices and their reliance on one another to do the same. Crucially,
the rivals need not have exchanged promises of assurances of their ac-
tions; it is enough that they have communicated their intent to act and
their reliance on others to do so. ... Communication of intent and re-
liance is a tangible, culpable action that diﬀers from the actions of firms
in an ordinary competition or in a simple conscious parallelism. The
character of the communications and their proximity to parallel action in
conformity with the communications distinguish them from other, benign
exchanges.22
A plus factor can then be a practice that communicates the intent and reliance
among firms to coordinate pricing. Towards identifying such plus factors, let us review
how express communication achieves intent and reliance. Suppose a firm is aware of
21Page (2009b), p. 445.
22Page (2009b), pp. 451, 452.
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how supracompetitive pricing results from conscious parallelism, as is described in
any industrial organization textbook. If a firm proposes to its rival that they price
in the described manner of conscious parallelism and the rival accepts this invitation
then, in fact, they are not engaging in conscious parallelism for there is an agreement.
The literal interpretation of their expressions leads to the mutual understanding that
we think of as an agreement because a firm finds it in its best interests to do as
it has expressed as long as it is believed by the other firm. In other words, this
communication produces an agreement because the words have meaning as to what
firms intend to do. A firm proposes to coordinate pricing because it believes that if the
other firm accepts this proposal then said coordinated pricing will ensue. Similarly,
the other firm accepts this proposal because it believes that, by doing so, coordinated
pricing will ensue.
Now suppose there is an action that would be in a firm’s best interests to take
only if it believed it would subsequently lead to coordinated pricing. Furthermore,
it is in the best interests of a rival firm to respond by taking the same action only
if it believed it would result in coordinated pricing. Just as the verbal invitation to
coordinate prices is made because its acceptance is expected to result in coordinated
pricing, a firm takes this action because the other firm’s similar response is expected
to result in coordinated pricing. Whether it is the spoken word or the implemented
action, each is made with the anticipation that firms will coordinate their prices. Of
course, whether they succeed or not is a distinct manner. What is essential is that
firms anticipate coordinated pricing when making a verbal proposal to do so or taking
an action that is in a firm’s best interests only if it resulted in coordinated pricing.
In a related manner, Richard Posner has proposed that conscious parallelism
can, in some instances, be thought as a contractual arrangement and thus warrant
prosecution (though he also recognizes that this approach is not consistent with
current judicial practice).
[O]ne seller communicates his "oﬀer" by restricting output, and the
oﬀer is "accepted" by the actions of this rivals in restricting their outputs
as well. It may therefore be appropriate in some cases to instruct a jury
to find an agreement to fix prices if it is satisfied that there was a tacit
meeting of the minds of the defendants on maintaining a noncompetitive
pricing policy. ... What is being proposed is less the alteration of the
substantive contours of the law than a change in evidentiary requirements
to permit illegal price fixing to be found in circumstances in which an
actual meeting of the minds on a noncompetitive price can be inferred
even though explicit collusion cannot be proved.23
As a member of the Seventh Circuit Court, Judge Posner also articulated this view
in High Fructose Corn Syrup (2002).
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids contracts, combinations, or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade. This statutory language is broad enough,
23Posner (2001), pp. 94-95, 98.
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as we noted in JTC Petroleum Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 190 F.3d
775, 780 (7th Cir. 1999), to encompass a purely tacit agreement to fix
prices, that is, an agreement made without any actual communication
among the parties to the agreement. If a firm raises price in the expecta-
tion that its competitors will do likewise, and they do, the firm’s behavior
can be conceptualized as the oﬀer of a unilateral contract that the oﬀerees
accept by raising their prices.24
At least as described, Posner’s example is problematic because the inference of
an agreement to coordinate pricing is just one of several that can be drawn. A
firm raising its price and the other firm responding in kind could just as well as
reflect competitive pricing in response to a rise in cost or demand. Either of those
factors would induce the first firm to raise price, while a competitive response by
its rival would be to also raise price. If there are several reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from these actions then one has failed to "exclude the possibility of
independent action" in which case an agreement cannot be inferred. The approach I
am deploying is more stringent in that it requires that the only reasonable inference
is that firms plan to coordinate pricing because firms’ actions are consistent with
their best interests only if coordinated pricing ensues. It is worth noting that an
attractive feature of this approach is that drawing an inference of conspiracy from
these actions will not deter legitimate behavior since a requirement for drawing such
an inference is that there is no legitimate rationale for these actions.25
I now turn to applying this approach to when posted pricing is the practice in
question.
Recommendation: An agreement is inferred when:
1) Prior to the adoption of posted pricing, firms routinely sold at prices below any
publicly announced list price.
2) The adoption of posted prices is consistent with a firm’s best interests only if it
anticipates that firms will subsequently coordinate their pricing.
3) Following the adoption of posted prices, prices are higher and more uniform across
firms.
4) The market is characterized by conditions (number of firms, entry barriers, etc.)
that make collusion (as defined by economists) feasible.
(2) provides communication of intent and reliance, as has been argued. By the
analysis in Section 4, we know that (2) is not vacuous for, when the savings in
consumer search and firm selling costs from a firm posting price are minimal, it is
24 In Re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation Appeal of A & W Bottling Inc et al, United
States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, 295 F3d 651, 2002.
25"[T]he question remains whether permitting an inference of conspiracy from the fact of such
publication would significantly deter important legitimate conduct." In re Coordinated Pretrial Pro-
ceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1990).
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not profitable for firms to post prices if they anticipate pricing competitively; only if
posted pricing can assist in coordinated pricing is such behavior optimal. However,
let us remind the reader of the caveat discussed in Section 4.3 and the need for
additional economic analysis.
(1) provides context to enhance the clarity of the communication in (2), the
relevance of which was noted in Esco (1965).
[I]t remains a question for the trier of fact to consider and determine
what inference appeals to it (the jury) as most logical and persuasive, after
it has heard all the evidence as to what these competitors had done before
such meeting, and what actions they took thereafter, or what actions they
did not take.26
When its rivals are expected to engage in discounting, it is clearly against a firm’s
interests to fix its price at some publicly announced level, as doing so makes it ex-
ceedingly easy for rivals to undercut the firm’s price and capture sales. Thus, if it
has been common practice to oﬀer discounts oﬀ of a list price, the adoption of a fixed
publicly announced price can only be in a firm’s best interests if it anticipates rivals
discontinuing the activity of discounting.
Consistent with the arguments made in Container (1969), (3) and (4) provide
evidence that the adoption of posted pricing had the eﬀect of allowing firms to coor-
dinate their prices, and serves to support the theoretical argument that it could only
have been done for that purpose. The practice in question in Container (1969) was
the repeated private exchange of customer-specific prices among firms. As stated by
Justice Fortas:
Theoretical probability, however, is not enough unless we are to regard
mere exchange of current price information as so akin to price-fixing by
combination or conspiracy as to deserve the per se classification. I am not
prepared to do this, nor it is necessary here. In this case, the probability
that the exchange of specific price information led to an unlawful eﬀect
upon prices is adequately buttressed by evidence in the record.27
If posted pricing successfully facilitated collusion then corroborative evidence is that
firms’ prices are higher and more strongly correlated (as, for example, was found
in the turbine generator market). Finally, as specified in (4), it is important to
establish that market conditions are consistent with collusion being stable, according
to economic theory and empirical evidence.28
I have argued that, under certain conditions, the adoption of posted pricing can
provide the requisite communication of intent and reliance to conclude concerted
action among firms. One critique is that the communication is not private among
firms, and public messages are too ambiguous to provide what is necessary to lead to
mutual understanding among firms.
26Esco Corp. v. United States 340 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1965).
27United States v. Container Corporation of America, 393 US 333 (1969).
28For a summary of these conditions, see Motta (2004).
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[C]oncerted action under Section 1 of the Sherman requires, beyond
evidence of parallel conduct, evidence that rivals have communicated their
intentions to act in a certain way and their reliance on each other to
follow suit. To convey the requisite information, the communication must
ordinarily be private and repeated, and must relate to present or future
prices. These considerations apply in the case of facilitating practices as
well. In the rural gas station hypothetical, for example, coordination of
prices would be more diﬃcult if the stations did not post their prices on
signs as well as at the pump. Thus, public price posting is literally a
facilitating practice that involves price communication. But courts would
certainly not find that posting prices on signs amounted to a plus factor,
because it also has the legitimate purpose of informing consumers of rivals’
prices. Public "signaling" and "monitoring" of prices are too ambiguous
in their eﬀects to amount to plus factors, because they cannot convey the
necessary intent and reliance.29
While these are valid points regarding the potential ambiguity of public signals,
the heart of the matter is not whether signals are public or private but rather whether
the signal’s content is clear. When a signal is meaningful to diﬀerent agents and for
diﬀerent reasons, there is ambiguity as to what is a firm’s intent in sending it. But not
all public signals suﬀer from such a lack of clarity. That publicly announced prices
could lead to an inference of conspiracy was recognized as a possibility in Petroleum
Products (1990).
[T]he tankwagon prices or dealer discounts are not of immediate signif-
icance to anyone other than the oil companies and their franchised dealers.
... [T]he dealers were individually notified concerning any changes in the
tankwagon prices or in the level of dealer discount. In light of this fact,
it appears that the public dissemination of such information served little
purpose other than to facilitate interdependent or collusive price coordi-
nation. ... [W]e believe that the evidence concerning the purpose and
eﬀect of price announcements, when considered together with the evi-
dence concerning the parallel price restorations, is suﬃcient to support a
reasonable and permissible inference of an agreement, whether express or
tacit, to raise or stabilize prices.30
The Ninth Circuit Court was making the point that, because the public announce-
ment of prices was of value only to sellers, it was not to be treated diﬀerently from
a private announcement among sellers. This is quite analogous to the preceding ar-
gument made with respect to posted pricing. While a policy of publicly announcing
fixed prices could be of value to buyers, in some instances it is not (specifically, where
consumer search costs are low) and, in those cases, a firm’s public announcement of
29Page (2010), pp. 25-6.
30 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432 (9th
Cir. 1990).
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list prices (with a policy of no discounting) is information that is useful only to its
rivals.
6 Concluding Remarks
Posted pricing is a common feature of many markets, and may be used to lessen
consumer search costs or selling costs incurred by firms. While there are then legit-
imate reasons for firms to stick to selling at list price, there are also cases - such as
the markets for turbine generators and gypsum wallboard - for which posted pricing
was implemented for the purpose of coordinating firms’ prices. One objective of this
paper was to identify market conditions under which the use of posted pricing is
inconsistent with competition. When the adoption of posted pricing has little eﬀect
on consumer search costs and firm selling costs, it was shown that the industry-wide
adoption of setting a list price with no discounting is contrary to firms’ interests when
they compete. Therefore, the adoption of posted pricing is optimal for firms only if
it results in coordinated pricing. While this finding may be suﬃcient to convince
economists that the adoption of posted pricing is evidence of collusion, it does not,
by itself, establish that firms have an agreement to restrain trade. It was then argued
that the adoption of posted pricing communicates the necessary intent and reliance
to coordinate prices which is required to infer concerted action.
Critical to drawing this inference is the argument that if some practice is only
in a firm’s best interests when it anticipates coordinated pricing then the adoption
of that practice is an invitation to coordinate pricing, and the subsequent adoption
of that same practice by a rival firm signals its acceptance of that invitation. From
this interpretation, an agreement is inferred. The courts have long recognized that
there can be an agreement without express communication but there remains the
matter of drawing the line between communication that conveys an agreement and
communication for which any such conveyance is ambiguous.
On the "too ambiguous" side of the spectrum is the scenario posed by Posner
(2001), whereby a firm raises its price (as an invitation to set supracompetitive prices)
and its rival responds in kind (as an acceptance of that invitation). Getting closer to
the legal-illegal divide is the public exchange of price intentions. In the Airline Tariﬀ
Publishing Company (ATPCO) case, the U.S. Department of Justice argued that
airlines were coordinating their prices through a form of riskless price leadership.31
An airline would announce a fare change with a "future first ticket date" which was
the first date at which tickets could be sold at the new fare. The fare change was
disseminated by ATPCO to all airlines and consumers through computer reservation
systems. With such a mechanism, a price leader who wanted all airlines to raise fares
could announce a future price increase and wait to learn whether it was matched by
other airlines. If it was, the price change would remain in the system and become
active at the first ticket date. If it was not matched then the airline would retract the
price change. As transactions could not take place at this new fare until the first ticket
date and the airline was not committed to the fare change, these prices were argued to
31For details, see Borenstein (1993).
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be a means for firms to communicate and coordinate their prices, rather than prices
at which to sell seats. The airlines claimed that this information was pro-competitive
because consumers benefitted from it. As the matter was resolved with a consent
decree prohibited the practice for 10 years, there was no judicial ruling as to whether
this practice communicates an agreement. Note that announcing future prices sheds
some of the ambiguity of the Posnerian signalling scenario because consumers cannot
transact at these prices; they are purely intentions about future prices.
Moving into clearly demarcated illegal territory is the repeated private exchange
of price information. In Container (1969),
... all that was present was a request by each defendant of its com-
petitor for information as to the most recent price charged or quoted,
whenever it needed such information and whenever it was not available
for another source. Each defendant on receiving that request usually fur-
nished the data with the expectation that it would be furnished reciprocal
information when it wanted it.
The anticipated reciprocity of sharing price information, which would not typically
occur under competition, attested to an agreement.32 In contrast to the Posnerian
and ATPCO scenarios, the price exchange was private and thus could not have been
beneficial to consumers. This practice then gets closer to the issues raised in this
paper in that it is diﬃcult to rationalize sharing price information with rival firms
unless it served to coordinate pricing.
32However, the Court did not conclude that this information sharing practice was a per se violation,
and relied upon evidence of its eﬀect to find a Section 1 violation.
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7 Appendix: Proof of Lemma 2
To prove pPQ1 > p
PP , we’ll show ∂π
PQ
1 (p1)
∂p1 > 0,∀p1 ≤ p
PP and thus firm 1’s optimal
price exceeds pPP when it posts price and firm 2 quotes price. A lower bound on
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1
is derived by evaluating it when ∂ψ
PQ
2 (p1,c2)
∂p1
is set equal to zero. In that case,
the incentive of firm 1 to raise price in order to increase firm 2’s price is neutralized.
We then show that this lower bound on ∂π
PQ
1 (p1)
∂p1 is non-negative and, since in fact
∂ψPQ2 (p1,c2)
∂p1 > 0, it follows that
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1 > 0. In short, reasonable properties on the
curvature of β (·) preserve the first-mover eﬀect to raise price which holds for the
deterministic cost case extends when cost is stochastic.
Take the first derivative of firm 1’s expected profit with respect to its price:
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1
=
Z c
c
h
β
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´
(7)
− (p1 − μ)β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´Ã
1− ∂ψ
PQ
2 (p1, c2)
∂p1
!#
F 0 (c2) dc2.
Before moving on in the analysis, let us convey why it is non-trivial to show that
moving first by posting price results in the firm setting a higher price. Consider (7)
evaluated at p1 = pPP :
∂πPQ1
¡
pPP
¢
∂p1
=
Z c
c
h
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
(8)
−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´Ã
1−
∂ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
∂p1
!#
F 0 (c2) dc2.
If πPQ1 (p1) is well-behaved then we need the preceding expression to be positive for
firm 1 to optimally price above pPP . When c2 = μ, the integrand in (8) is positive
since ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
= pPP :
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
− pPP
´
−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
− pPP
´Ã
1−
∂ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
∂p1
!
= β (0)−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0 (0)
Ã
1−
∂ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
∂p1
!
= β (0)−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0 (0) +
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0 (0)
Ã
∂ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
∂p1
!
=
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0 (0)
Ã
∂ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
∂p1
!
> 0
as
β (0)−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0 (0) = 0
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is the equilibrium condition defining pPP . The problem in signing (8) is that, for
values of c2 other than μ, the integrand in (8) could be positive or negative and,
if it is negative for some values of c2, then it is not immediately clear that, after
integrating over all values for c2, (8) is positive. To show that the integrand in (8)
can be negative, begin by re-arranging the integrand,
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
(9)
+
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´Ã∂ψPQ2 ¡pPP , c2¢
∂p1
!
.
The third term is positive, which is the first-mover eﬀect that induces firm 1 to set a
higher price. Take the derivative of the first two terms with respect to c2:h
β0
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β00
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´iÃ∂ψPQ2 ¡pPP , c2¢
∂c2
!
,
and evaluate at c2 = μ:h
β0
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
− pPP
´
−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β00
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
− pPP
´iÃ∂ψPQ2 ¡pPP , μ¢
∂c2
!
=
£
β0 (0)−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β00 (0)
¤Ã∂ψPQ2 ¡pPP , μ¢
∂c2
!
= β0 (0)
Ã
∂ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
∂c2
!
> 0.
Hence, for ε small and positive, the sum of the first two terms in (9) is negative for
c2 below but close to μ:
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ− ε
¢
− pPP
´
−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ− ε
¢
− pPP
´
< 0.
Hence, (9) could be positive or negative.
Returning to the objective of showing that pPQ1 > p
PP , a suﬃcient condition is:
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1
> 0,∀p1 ∈
£
μ, pPP
¤
. (10)
To prove (10), it’ll be necessary to suppose ∂ψ
PQ
2 (p1,c2)
∂p1 > 0 and
∂ψPQ2 (p1,c2)
∂c2 > 0, both
of which hold assuming (6).
First note that if p1 = μ then
∂πPQ1 (μ)
∂p1
=
Z c
c
β
³
ψPQ2 (μ, c2)− μ
´
F 0 (c2) dc2 > 0.
Hence, from hereon assume p1 > μ. Since
∂ψPQ2 (p1,c2)
∂p1 > 0 then it follows from (7)
that
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1
>
Z c
c
h
β
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´
− (p1 − μ)β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´i
F 0 (c2) dc2.
(11)
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Since β0 (0) ≥ β0 (∆) ∀∆ then it follows from (11) that
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1
>
Z c
c
h
β
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´
− (p1 − μ)β0 (0)
i
F 0 (c2) dc2 ≡ Ω (p1) . (12)
Consider Ω (p1) evaluated at p1 = pPP :
Ω
¡
pPP
¢
=
Z c
c
h
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
−
¡
pPP − μ
¢
β0 (0)
i
F 0 (c2) dc2 (13)
=
Z c
c
∙
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
−
µ
μ+
1
2β0 (0)
− μ
¶
β0 (0)
¸
F 0 (c2) dc2
=
Z c
c
∙
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
− 1
2
¸
F 0 (c2) dc2
where recall pPP = μ+ 1
2β0(0) . From (12), if Ω
¡
pPP
¢
≥ 0 then ∂πPQ1
¡
pPP
¢
/∂p1 > 0.
By (13), Ω
¡
pPP
¢
≥ 0 if and only ifZ c
c
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
F 0 (c2) dc2 ≥
1
2
. (14)
To establish (14), we’ll need to derive how firm 2’s best reply responds to its cost.
Take the total derivative of (5) with respect to firm 2’s cost:
0 = −β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´Ã∂ψPQ2 (p1,c2)
∂c2
!
+ β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´Ã
1− ∂ψ
PQ
2 (p1,c2)
∂c2
!
−
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− c2
´
β00
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´Ã∂ψPQ2 (p1,c2)
∂c2
!
β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´
=
∂ψPQ2 (p1,c2)
∂c2
h
2β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´
+
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− c2
´
β00
³
ψPQ2 (p1,c2)− p1
´i
∂ψPQ2 (p1,c2)
∂c2
=
β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´
2β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´
+
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− c2
´
β00
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´ .
(15)
Therefore, ∂ψ
PQ
2 (p1,c2)
∂c2
> 0 if (6) holds. Since
pPP = ψPQ2
¡
pPP , μ
¢
and ∂ψ
PQ
2 (p1,c2)
∂c2 > 0, it follows that
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
⎧
⎨
⎩
< 0 if c2 < μ
= 0 if c2 = μ
> 0 if c2 > μ
(16)
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Since
β00 (∆)
⎧
⎨
⎩
≥ 0 if ∆ < 0
= 0 if ∆ = 0
≤ 0 if ∆ > 0
then it follows from (16) that
β00
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´⎧⎨
⎩
≥ 0 if c2 < μ
= 0 if c2 = μ
≤ 0 if c2 > μ
(17)
Using (17), we conclude from (15),
∂ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
∂c2
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
≤ 12 if c2 < μ
= 12 if c2 = μ
≥ 12 if c2 > μ
(18)
By definition, we have
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
pPP −
R μ
c2
µ
∂ψPQ2 (pPP ,c2)
∂c2
¶
dc2 if c2 < μ
pPP if c2 = μ
pPP +
R μ
c2
µ
∂ψPQ2 (pPP ,c2)
∂c2
¶
dc2 if c2 > μ
(19)
Using (18) in (19), we have a lower bound on ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
:
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢⎧⎨
⎩
≥ pPP + 12 (c2 − μ) if c2 < μ
= pPP if c2 = μ
≥ pPP + 12 (c2 − μ) if c2 > μ
and therefore
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP ≥ 1
2
(c2 − μ) .
Since β is increasing, we then have
β
³
ψPQ2
¡
pPP , c2
¢
− pPP
´
≥ β
µ
1
2
(c2 − μ)
¶
. (20)
We can now prove that (14) holds. By (20), a suﬃcient condition for (14) to be
true is Z c
c
β
µ
1
2
(c2 − μ)
¶
F 0 (c2) dc2 ≥
1
2
. (21)
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Next note thatZ c
c
β
µ
1
2
(c2 − μ)
¶
F 0 (c2) dc2 =
Z μ
c
β
µ
1
2
(c2 − μ)
¶
F 0 (c2) dc2 +
Z c
μ
β
µ
1
2
(c2 − μ)
¶
F 0 (c2) dc2
=
Z c
μ
∙
1− β
µ
1
2
(c2 − μ)
¶¸
F 0 (c2) dc2 +
Z c
μ
β
µ
1
2
(c2 − μ)
¶
F 0 (c2) dc2
=
Z c
μ
F 0 (c2) dc2 =
1
2
.
where the second equality follows from A1 and the symmetry of F 0. Hence, (21) is
true.
Having shown
∂πPQ1
¡
pPP
¢
∂p1
> 0,
we still need to show that
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1
> 0,∀p1 ∈
£
μ, pPP
¢
.
What we have is:
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1
> Ω (p1) , ∀p1 > μ; and Ω
¡
pPP
¢
≥ 0
Since
Ω0 (p1) = −
Z c
c
β0
³
ψPQ2 (p1, c2)− p1
´Ã
1− ∂ψ
PQ
2 (p1,c2)
∂p1
!
F 0 (c2) dc2 − β0 (0) < 0
then Ω
¡
pPP
¢
≥ 0 implies
Ω (p1) > 0, ∀p1 ∈
£
μ, pPP
¢
,
and, therefore,
∂πPQ1 (p1)
∂p1
> 0,∀p1 ∈
£
μ, pPP
¢
.
We conclude that firm 1’s optimal posted price, given firm 2 quotes price, exceeds
pPP . This means that pPQ1 > p
PP so that, given firm 1 posts price, firm 1’s price
is higher when firm 2 has the quoted price format than when firm 2 has the posted
price format.
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